巴黎协定背景下全球减排博弈模拟研究

doi:10.12006/j.issn.1673-1719.2017.044

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

构建了具有7个国家集团的全球多国家集团气候博弈集成评估模拟系统,针对《巴黎协定》背景下各国至2050年以及2100年的减排目标,分别对减排博弈的纳什均衡、博弈不确定性以及外部政策对减排博弈的影响展开了模拟分析。研究发现：在基准情景下,全球各国将在2030年后均选择不减排策略,全球至2100年升温达到2.62℃;而模型参数的不确定性也未能突破全球零减排的纳什均衡;而仅当在全球范围内对不减排采取惩罚措施时,全球零减排的纳什均衡点被打破。但在当前《巴黎协定》减排承诺下,为达到2℃的温控目标,加大2030—2050年的减排幅度至关重要,否则全球将在2040年左右突破2℃阈值。

关键词: 气候博弈, 减排, 巴黎协定, 2℃目标

Abstract:

A seven-region based integrated assessment model is established in this paper targeting to model the emission reduction game worldwide. Under the Paris Agreement, given the emission mitigation scheme by 2025/2030, 2050, and 2100 for each country (region) as gaming strategy, the Nash equilibrium, the uncertainties of the game and the influences from external mitigation mechanisms are evaluated in each strategy combinations. In the reference scenario, no country (region) would take emission reduction after 2030 for the sake of their own optimal social welfare improvement, leading the global temperature rising to 2.62℃ by 2100. The Nash equilibrium remains stable even when the climatic and economic parameters are disturbed. As an alternative, an external sanction on non-mitigation is applied; in this scenario, climate change mitigation propagates across countries (regions) according to various sanction levels, in which developed countries tend to adopt mitigation strategy earlier than developing countries as a response to the non-mitigation sanction. Meanwhile, under the Paris Agreement, simulation also reveals the emission reduction from 2030 to 2050 has become crucial for making the 2℃ threshold viable if no extra mitigations are implemented before 2030. An emission reduction target higher than the “developed and developing countries cutting emission 80% and 50% on 1990 level by 2050” is required in this circumstance, otherwise the global temperature will overshoot 2℃ around 2040.

Key words: Climate game, Emission reduction, Paris Agreement, 2℃ target

吴静, 朱潜挺, 王诗琪, 王铮. 巴黎协定背景下全球减排博弈模拟研究[J]. 气候变化研究进展, 2018, 14(2): 182-190.

Jing WU, Qian-Ting ZHU, Shi-Qi WANG, Zheng WANG. Game simulation on emission reduction under the background of the Paris Agreement[J]. Climate Change Research, 2018, 14(2): 182-190.

图/表 8

表1 至2100年各国家集团分阶段减排方案

Table 1 Staged emission reduction scheme for each country group through 2100

图1 RIACG模型流程图

Fig. 1 Flowchart of RIACG model

图2 基准情景的纳什均衡下全球至2100年升温趋势（相对于工业化前）

Fig. 2 Global temperature rise through 2100 under the reference scenario at the Nash equilibrium

图3 各策略组合下全球总社会福利收益分布注：雷达图中圈外二进制数字串表示基准情景下各策略组合;圈内数据表示各策略组合下的全球总福利收益,单位：万亿美元;图中曲线表示在不同策略组合下全球总福利收益变化的趋势。

Fig. 3 Distribution of global social welfare in different strategies

表2 参数不确定性分析情景

Table 2 Scenarios for parameter uncertainties analyses

图4 情景s1,s2,s3下社会福利较基准情景变化情况

Fig. 4 Social welfare change in Scenario s1, s2, and s3 comparing to the reference scenario

图5 各情景下全球升温趋势比较

Fig. 5 Global temperature rise comparison in different scenarios

图6 情景p4和p5的纳什均衡下全球至2100年升温趋势

Fig. 6 Global temperature rise through 2100 in Scenario p4 and p5 at the Nash equilibrium

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